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1.  Introduction 
.·  ..,. 
The  European  Monetary  System  <EMS)  celebrated its fifth 
anniversary  just  over  a  month  ago  and  has  thus  now  been  in 
existence  for  long  enough  for  a  reasonably  balanced 
assesment  of  its performance  to  be  made  and  maybe  even  for 
certain  lessons  to  be  drawn  from  that  performance. 
I  ~·Ji sh  first to  1 ook  at  the  inter-nal  and  ~-: ternal 
context  in  which  the  EMS  was  set  up.  Internally it is part 
of  the overall  process  of  monetary  integration  which  has 
always  been  and  will  remain  one  of  the  key  elements within 
the  European  Community.  The  EMS  has,  therefore,  "a political 
dimension  which  makes  adherence  to the  system  not  just  a 
qu•:?t:;tion  of  economic  e:-:pediency".  E)-:ternally it is part  o·f 
tht:!  i nterne:;ti onc:'tl  m.cmetc'lry  system  clnd  must  co-e:.; i st with  it. 
Understanding  is not  advanced  either by  seeing  the  EMS  as  a 
device  ~imed primarily at  sheltering the  Community  from  the 
rest  of  the world,  or  as  an attempt  to recreate  something  • 
whjch  no  longer  exists in  the rest  of  the world.  I  shall 
also  try to assess  how  the  system  has  performed  du~ing its 
first  five  years  and  the degree  to which  its original  goals 
have  been  fulfilled.  I  will  conclude  by  outlininge  some  of 
our  immediate  hopes  possibilities for  further  development. 
2.  The  EMS  in  Context 
'""---""-'···~ "-'"•'-'>-->-'- --··-~·---·-..  ~-~------------·· -· 
Although  the setting  up  of  the  EMS  was  an  important  and 
historic  development,  it did  not  represent  the  beginning  of 
monetary  cooperation  within  the European  Community.  An 
appreciation  of  its implications  and  achievements  is easier 
if  the  EMS  is seen  as  part  of  the overall  process of  forming 
the  Community.  A  developed  monetary  organi~ation is one  of 
the essential  ingredients  in  the creation  of  a  unified 
internal  market.  One  is unlikely to  succeed  without  the 
other.  Conversely~  if  the political  commitment  to  economic 
integration  in  Europe  falters,  there will  be  serious 
consequences also for  the  EMS. 
In  the early years  of  the  Community,  the  Bretton  Woods 
regime  was  working  smoothly  and  efficiently,  with  the  U.S. 
providinc;J  <.:t  ~;;;cJlid  "anchot·-"  fc.JI~  other  countries'  performance. 
1 
J Cc-tpi ·tal  mobil it·,.,  beb•Jeen  nati anal  economi eS--w-.a-s--sti-1--1------------ ·· 
limited,  and  infl.:ttion differ-entials among  member-s  of the 
Community,  as  indeed  among  indtTstrraT-countr-ies  genet.:.-aliy, 
were  of  the  order- of  only  1-2 percentage points  a  year-. 
There  was  ther-efor-e  a  monetar-y  or-ganisation  and  monetary 
stability.  The  maintainance  of  exchange  r-ate  stability as 
well  was  hence  not  difficult;  ther-e  were  only  two  parity 
chang£;-:r;:;  ~vi tr'd n  the  Community ..,c:JLtr i ng  the fir-st -t-err·-yeal""'S'--u.f·· 
its e;< i  stencE"~. 
As  a  full  participant  in  the  international  monetary 
system  then  pr-evailing~  Europe  had  a  monetary  organisation, 
if not  a  monetary  identity.  The  most  pr-essing  task  was  to 
get  on  with  the  job  of  removing  tariffs and  other obstacles 
to  a  common  internal  market. 
The  Treaty  of  Rome  does  net  neglect  the  need  for 
monetary  or-ganisation  ncr  for  its institutional 
infrastructure.  Article  105 sets  up  the  Monetary  Committee 
"j, n  m-der  ..  to  pi·-omote  coordination  of  the policies of  t•iember~ 
States  in  the  monetary  field  to  the full  extent  needed  for 
thE?!  func,tioning  of  .the  common  market".  It  wc:ts  also 
recognised  that  exchange rate  changes  need  special 
considerations,  and· Article  107  states that  ''Each  Member-
State  s~all  treat its policy  with  regard  to rates of  exchange 
as  2.  rnatter  oi:  common  concet-n". 
As  soon  as  the monetary  organisation  provided  by  the 
Bretton  Woods  system  started to  break  down,  various  schem8s 
for  putting flesh  on  these  bones  provided  by  the  Treaty  were 
devised.  The  first  major  and  most  ambitious  attempt  was  the 
Werner  Report  of  1970.  As  well  as  calling  for  increased 
fi~cal  and  monetary  cooperation,  the report  proposed  total 
convertibility and  the elimination  of  fluctuations  in 
exchange  rates  between  Community  currencies.  It  added  that 
tb_~.l'.:::!l:b:Qt:rlc:t  -pr-efer,E~bry  be·repiaC:ed by  .:1  single cLtrrency.  The 
-~irst stage  in  this  proc~ss was  to  be  a  gradual  narrowing  of 
the  margins  of  permissible fluctuation  to  plus  or  minus  0.75 
percent.  This  initial  step  was,  however,  quickly  overtaken 
b·/  the  events  .. 
After  President  Nixon  closed  the  gold  window  in  August 
1971,  both  the  Community  and  the rest  of  the  world  answered 
by  trying  to replace the  most  obvious  aspect  of  the  previous 
system,  the exchange rate arrangements.  The  Smithsonian 
aqreement  of  December  1971  provided  for  a 
r;turn  to  pegged  exchange  rates,  but  with  wider  margins  of 
permissible fluctuation.  Whatever  the arguments  for  greater 
.  exchange  rate flexibility  in  the  world  as  a  whole,  it was 
already considered  at  that  time  that  there  was  no  need  to 
allow  Community  currencies  to fluctute against  each  other  by 
2 the  netrJ  wider· mat-gins.  A·::;  a  result,  early-in1972 ~the~-----­
Communit.y  established its own  e;-:change  rate  r~_i_{1}~,_t,he  ·::;o-
c:.;.ll ed  "snakE·",  under  which  irieri1her- C:cil.tntri es'  e;-:change  ;--.;.tes 
were  held  within  a  narrower  band  of  plus or  minus  2.25%. 
Tile  "snake"  was  a  part  i <::11  system.  It could  !r..!Or k  for  a 
group  of  countries clearly in  the  deutschmark  zone,  but  it 
dicJ  not  have  the~  over<::<ll  pol:4-cy  makin-g-app.:n<:rtcrsnol~  the 
political  commitment  necessary to  make  it work  for  a  broader 
and  less cohesive  group  of  countries.  One  after  the  other 
the  United  Kingdom  (and  with  it Ireland),  Italy and  France 
dropped  out.  Of  course,  it was  a  difficult period,  and  the 
impact  of  the first  oil  crisis would  have  placed  a  heavy 
strain  on  any  regime  of  fixed  but  adjustable exchange rates. 
ThEe•  inability of  the  1972  arrangements  to survi-ve  mLtst, 
however,  be  ascribed  more  to  the political  and  policy 
differences  in  the response  to the oil  shock,  than  to its 
direct  impact.  There  was  a  marked  divergence  of  views  on  how 
to react  to the disequilibria  provoked  by  the oil  price 
increase;  some  countries giving  priority to the control  of 
inflation  and  prompt.  external  adjustment,  while others, 
intti<::dl)/  at  leas;t,.  ~~Jere  mot-e  concei~ned  with  ma.intaining 
emp 1 oyment  in  the  shor-t  run.  In,  any  case the  "snake" 
arrangements  provid~d a  useful  experience  on  which  a  more 
ambitioJs  system  could  be built  upon.  • 
A  crucial  lesson  from  this period  was  the  symbiotic 
nature  of  economic  coordination  and  exchange  rate stability. 
Some  disillusionment  with  the  promised  gains  from  increased 
policy  independence  and  the experiences  with  exchange rate 
instability,  led  the  Community  to re-attach greater  weight  to 
policy  coordination.  The  period  between  the Smithsonian 
agreement  and  the setting  up  of  the  EMS  witnessed  very  large 
exchange rate movements,  both  nominal  and  real,  both  inside 
and  outside  the  Community.  To  single European  economies, 
ct':'l::tAc::t'L  ;:":\1'"(;:;  considel·-abiy  mor'e  open  than  the  US  ,:md  Jap.:ln,  the:,se 
exchange  rate  movements  had  certain highly undesireable 
consequences.  In  the strong  ~urrency countries real  exchange 
rate  appreciation,  while  undoubtedly  helpful  as  a  means  of 
exerting  downward  pressure  on  costs and  prices,  seriously 
eroded  the profitability of  exporting  industries  and  tended 
to  depress  investment;  while  in  the  weak  c~rrency countries, 
especially those  with  a  high  degree  of  wage  indexation, 
rising  import  prices  gave  an  additional  boost  to  the 
inflationary spiral.  Moreover,  exchange  rate misalignment 
was  encouraging  demands  for  protection  from  industries that 
felt  themselves  threatened,  so  that  the  Community's  major 
economic  achievement  and  the  symbol  of  European  unity,  the 
common  market  itself,  was  in  jeopardy.  In  these conditions 
there  was  a  strongly held belief,  voiced  most  cogently  by  the 
leaders  of  Germany  and  France at  that  time,  but  shared  with 
~; 
i  .. \'ar-yi ng  degr-e1?.s  o·f  enthw::i asm  by  the other  member~~---~------­
countries,  that  something  needed  to  be  done  to restore  a 
measure  of  stability. 
. ·--- -~-------------~----·--- --·-'  - ~·· 
E:~tet-nc:;l  reasons  wert?  Of"JJ"2  of  the  pro;.: i mate  factors 
behind  the setting  up  of  the  EMS.  The  German  authorities 
were  worried  that  the  weakness  of  the dollar at  that  time  was 
having  a  disproportionate effect  on  the deutschmark. 
Footloose  capital~  flowing  out  of  dollars,  tended  to  flow 
into deutschmark  rather  than  into the  other  European 
currencies,  thus  forcing  the  deutschmark  up  not  only  against 
the  dollar  but  also against  the  currencies  of  i~s close 
European  trading  partners.  The  Germans  hoped  that  a  fixed 
exchange  rate link  with  other  EC  currencies  would  mitigate 
this tendency.  However,  as  important  as this short-ter-m 
phenomenum  was  in  acting  as  a  catalyst  to bring  about  the 
political  reaction  necessary to create the  EMS,  it is  longer 
term  considerations  which  were  more  important. 
I 
The  external  context  mir-rored  the  internal  one,  and 
suggest~d to  the Community  that  not  only  did  it require  more 
monetary  organisation for  its own  inter-nal  purposes,  but  al•o 
that  the external  world  demanded  that it progressively 
develop  its own  monetary  identity.  The  breakdown  qf  the 
Bretton  Woods  system  was  not  only'the  aba~donment of 
an  exchange  rate regime,  it was  also the loss of  the anchor 
of  the  system.  As  the 70's progressed it became  increasingly 
obvious  that  in  a  highly  interdependent  world,  composed  of  a 
small  number  of  large,  but  nearly equally economically 
powerful,  blocks,  a.hegemonic  system  was  no  longer  optimal  or 
indeed  possible.  The  world  has  thus  been  hesitantly moving 
towards  a  multiple  currency reserve  system  since then. 
·---·-~  ------·-------~i-,~  a  paper  recently published  by  the  Institute,  Pon 
McKinnon  has  set  out  some  proposals for  a  better  organisation 
of  this type  of  system.  There  is plenty  of  room  for 
disagreement  over  the  exact  nature  of  a  reformed 
international  monetary  system,  but  two  things  seem  to  be 
reasonably clear.  First that it will  need  more rather  than 
less organisation  at  the  international  level.  In  fact it 
will  demand  active cooperation.  Second  that  each  of  the 
major  currency  blocks  will  have  to  be  relatively well 
organised  within  itself  so  as  to  be  able  to  adequately  play 
its part  in  the  whole.  Japan  is making  moves,  supported  and 
cajoled  by  the  US,  to  internationalize the  yen  and  to  open  up 
its domestic  capital  markets.  Europe  also is making  its 
moves,  and  the  EMS  is the cornerstone of  these. 
4 Having  reviewed  the background,  both  iRterna.J--afld---------
e:-:-ternal,  against  which  the  EIVJS  was  ct-eated,  _i t__!__§__p_q§si l:Jl e 
to  1 ay  do11-m  the cr  i te·ri a  by·  whTC:fi  Tf--shoul d  be  assessed.  It 
should  be  fairly obvious  that  success  or  failure cannot  be 
judged  solely  in  terms  of  its ability to stabilize exchange 
rates within  the  Community.  The  first criteria must  be  its 
success  in  achieving  monetary  stability,  defined  primarily  in 
tf:?nils ·o-f  pt--ic:e  stc:-lbili.ty  bLtt.,.al·::;c.:J  including  exc:harrge  r<:?;t_e ___  _ 
stability.  However,  importance  must  also be  attached to the 
following: 
- the  degree  and  development  of  economic  policy 
com-di n<::\t i em; 
the role of  the  EMS  within  the  international  monetary 
sys.tem; 
the creation  of  a  monetary  identity  and~he role of 
thE:!  ECU. 
3  Monetary  Stability 
~~1  Eci£§  §t~gilitx 
1'1olr'etary  stabi-lity  me·a.ns  first  and  foremost  price 
stability,  both  in  terms  of  a  low  overall  rate of  inflation 
and  in  ierms  of  a  small  differential  between  the inflation  • 
rates  in  the  Member  States.  It  was  not  expected  that  the 
establishment  of  the  EMS  would  create price stability 
instantaneously.  Progress  has  however  been  disappointing, 
partly because  of  difficult external  circumstances  and  partly 
because  the constraints  imposed  by  the  exchange rate 
mechanism  and  other  tools for  policy  convergence  have  taken 
time  to  develop  their potential,  and  were  especilly soft  in 
tho first  years  of  the system. 
The  five  year  period  since  the  EMS  was  established  can 
be  cli··-hcl~cl  into t·wottistinct  sLtB--pet-iods.  In  the fir-st  half 
of  fhe  quinquennium  the  tommunity's  average rate of  inflation 
under  the  influence of  the  second  oil  shock,  accelerated 
sharply  and  inflation differentials between  member  countries 
widened,  due  partly  to differences  in  the  degree  of  their 
vulnerability to higher  oil  prices,  but  also  and  more 
importantly,  to differences  in  the types  of  economic  and 
monetary  policies which  they  pursued.  France,  Italy and 
Ireland  had  joined  the  EMS  at  exchange  rates at  which  their 
costs and  prices were  highly  competitive vis-a-vis those  of 
[:!E::-rm<:lny  and  the  smc:-\ller  "snc:d::e"  countr·ies.  In  the early 
years  of  the system's existence,  therefore,  inflation 
differentials could  persist for  some  time  before  the  exchange 
rate constraint  began  to  be  felt.  However,  as realignments 
only  partially offset_these differentials the  system 
gradually  came  to exercise  an  increasingly  disciplinary 
5 pressure.  Dur-ing  tile  1 ast  two  year-s  that  di-sc:ip1-i-ne  fia-s~----­
become  more  deliberate ahd  has  resulted  in  a  marked 
con\tergence  of  monetat-y  policy starices  ___ and -pro.fOLtnd--
readjustment  of  fiscal  and  economic  policies in certain 
member  states. 
Tile  resulting  developments  on  inflation rates  can  be 
seen  ffom  the data  presented Jn  table  1. 
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In  the early part  of  the  period  both  because the 
constraints of  the  system were  new  and  weak  and  because  of 
exterior  shocks,  the inflation differential  widened  from  an 
already high  level.  From  1982  onwards  the  average  inflation 
rate in  the  Community  started steadily to decline,  but  the 
difference between  the  lowest  and  the highest  inflation rates 
remained  above  the  1979  level.  Our  forecasts  show  that  the 
- ......  _;;.:Lt:t..tati:cnwirT  tfiange  di~amaticall.y this  year.  The  CommLtnity 
average  will  drop  to close to  5%  and  the differential  to 
around  8  percent.  Wilen  compared  with  the  experience after 
the first oil  price  increase,  the decline  in  the  average 
inflation rate  and  in  the differential  is considerably larger 
si~ce the existence  of  the  EMS. 
As  discussed  in  John  Williamson's  recent  paper  ,  there 
are  various  ways  of  measuring  exchange  rate variability.  It 
can  be  measured  through  bilateral  or  effective rates  in 
nominal  or  real  terms;  and  it can  be  measured  over  short 
periods  such  as  from  week  to  week  or  month  to  month,  or  aver 
longer  periods,  such  as  a  year  or  more 
•  t 
j Let  me  take short  term  variability first.  It is 
doubt·FLtl  whether  over  pet-i ods  of"  a  ~weel<~amonth-the 
concept  of  "real",  or  inflation adjusted,  e:-:change  rate 
changes  has  much  significance,  so  I  shall  confine  myself  here 
to  nominal  changes. 
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Table  2  shows  average  mont~ to  month  changes  pf  the  main 
EMS  and  non  EMS  currencies against  the  deutschmark  during  the 
five  years  before the  EMS  went  into operation  and  the five 
years  since.  It is clear  that  for  the French  franc  and  the 
lira~  the  two  currencies  which  were  floating  freely  against 
the  deutschmark  during  the  pre-EMS  period  but  which  have  had 
fixed  but  adjustable rates since  1979,  short-term variability 
has  been  sharply  reduced.  For  the  Benelux  currencies,  which 
had  fixed  but  adjustable rates against  the deutschmark  during 
bcl'l::h  Pfi'F'_~od·s,  varj.ability has  been  low  dw-ing  both  periods. 
-··---·--··k·  -"·-~·---------······  --··-·-rr;--~t~:",e  C.dS€~  o·f  Ster  .ling  and  ffi(:"\jar  riOfl-·COfTiffiLtn it  y·  Cltrrer1C i E•S 
such  as  the dollar  and  the  yen,  which  have all  been  floating 
freely  against  the deutschmark,  short-term variability has 
been  high  during  both  periods. 
Effective rate variability gives the  same  pattern  as 
that  of  bilateral  rates.  The  weighted  average  mcnth  to  month 
variability of  EMS  currencies against  all  maJor  currencies, 
both  inside and  outside the  EMS,  has  also  been  significantly 
less  than  the  weighted  average  month  to  month  variability of 
the dollar,  yen  and  sterling against  all  currencies  - largely 
of  course,  because  for  each  EMS  currency  the  combined  weight 
of  other  EMS  currencies  in  the  basket  used  to calculate the 
weighted  average  change  is fairly  heavy.  Thus  the  EMS  has 
been  pretty successful  in  reducing  short-run  instability in .. 
the  e;.:ch.:lfll:;Je  r-ates  of  the  pai~ticipant countr--ies.--Orr'th±s----
poi nt.  the evi denc::e  <:tppears  to  be  clear·  and  Ltnam_t;)_:i__g_w;>t,t£;;._ 
''  ..... -.~---------·-----------
In  the  view  of  a  majority  of  economists,  the real 
disadvantage  of  floating  rates,  as  they  have  operated  over 
the  last  11  years,  is that  they  have  led  to exaggerated 
movements  over  the  medium  term  unrelated  to the  underlying 
ch.,,-tnge-'5  in  countJ~  i e·::;'  e;< t(:?rn<it.l  payments  posit  ions;,--to 
"CJVET-shoot  j. ng 
11  and 
11 mi s<:d i gnment 
11  of  e>:change  rates  ···  i.e. 
to  exchange  rates which  have  been  incompatible  with  a 
structure of  external  payments  for  the  country  concerned  that 
is sustainable  in  the  medium  term  or  which,  to  use  John 
Williamson's definition,  have  shown  a  persistent departure 
from  their  long  run  equilibrium  levels. 
In  this  context  it is more  instructive to  look  at  real 
exch~nge rate variability  (since  large  movements  in  nomjnal 
exchange  rates over  a  period  of  several  years  may  simply 
offset  large differentials in  inflation rates). 
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T~bl~ 3  shows. that  ~here has  been  a  very  substantial 
fall  in  medium  term  real  exchange  rate variability between 
the  seven  currencies  which  make  up  the  EMS  in  the five years 
since the  system  was  established  compared  with  the  preceding 
five  years.  For  France  and  Italy both  the average  and  the 
maximum  deviation  from  trend  has  decreased  dramatically.  It 
is interesting to note that  for  Italy,  which  participates  in 
the  exchange  mechanism  with  6  percent  margins  rather  than  the 
usual  2  1/4 percent,  the  improvement  has,  if  anything,  been 
greater.  For  Ireland,  which  previously  was  part  of  a 
currency  union  with  the  UK,  the average  has  declined  a  little 
and  the  maximum  has  been  nearly halved.  For  the Netherlands 
there is virtually no  difference  in either  measure  between 
the  two  periods.  Belgium-Luxembourg  and  Denmark  have 
experienced  virtually no  change  in  the  average  but  the 
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.. ma.;.: i mum  ~-Jas  s·omewhat  grec:o~ter·  si  nee  the  EMS  lo'Jas~-est:aa-1-ishe-el------··~ ·-· 
b-=:·cause  both  cot.tntr·-i es  were  already  st.tffet-i ng  __  fr_~!!!-_.!_~g~-- __ . 
strLtctural  bal <mce  of  pc:lyments  delfc-fts  -i-n-the closing  yeat-s 
of  the  last  decade  and  in  both  cases  a  substantial  downward 
adjustment  of  real  exchange  rates has  been  an  indispensable 
element  in  the  strategy of  the authorities for  restoring 
external  balance  .  .  ·  ... 
Because  the  EMS  countries conduct  a  high  proportion  of 
their  trade with  each  other  the stability of  intra-EMS  real 
exchange rates is reflected  in  the  behaviour  of  the  EMS 
countries'  real  exchange rates vis-a-vis  industrial  countries 
as  a  whole.  Since  1979  real  exchange  rate variability, 
measured  against  a  basket  of  all  industrial  countries' 
currencies  Cboth  those  inside  and  those  outsid~ the  EMS)  has 
been  substantially less for  EMS  currencies  than  for  the  major 
freely floating  currencies  such  as  the  US  dollar,  yen,  pound 
sterling  and  Swiss  franc  (see  table 4).  In  short  the  system 
has  functioned  in  such  a  way  as  to attenuate the  misalignment 
induced  by  the  exaggerated  movement  of  the  major  outside 
I 
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pat-tially  o-f  the  day  to day  flLtctuations  t<Jithin  th~_p_§>f:.fJ:l.i.i:.ted 
margins  and  parti  <:tll 'l  of  chahges··-rr-,  central  rates,  nor--mally 
known  as  realignments.  Since  the  EMS  went  into operation 
there  have  been  seven  exchange rate realignments  between  the 
participants.  The  increased  frequency  and  size of  these 
realignments  are cited  as  evidence of  the ihability of  the 
systG!in-'to  <:"'.chi,:?'·/e  its  objecti-~'ves.  This seems-to-me-·  - ---------· 
altogether  too naive  and  simplistic  a  way  of  looking  at  the 
matter.  Clearly,  the  more  perfectly the  mechanisms  of  policy 
coordination  between  the  member  states are  working  and  the 
greater  the  convergence  of  economic  performance that  is 
achieved,  the less frequently  exchange  rates will  have  to be 
adjusted.  But  nobody  expected  perfect  convergence  from  the 
start.  It  was  always  accepted  that this would be  a  slow 
process  and  that  during  the transitional  period  exchange 
rates  would  have  to  be  changed  from  time  to time;  although it 
was  hoped  that  the  frequency  of  such  adjustments  would 
gradually decrease.  Over  a  year  has  now  passed  without  a 
r~?al  j_  c;nment.. 
Of  pourse  the  need  to carry out  fairly frequent 
adjustments  does  reflect shortcomings  in  policy coordination 
and  a  failure to achieve substantial  convergence  of  economic 
per~·J=ormanc:(~.  But  I  believe that  there are also  po·::;i ti  V<'2  , 
conclusions to  be  drawn  from  the  way  in  which  exchange  rate 
changes  have  been  managed  in  the  system.  Adjustme~ts have 
for  the  most  part  been  carried  out  before  exchange  rates  have 
had  time  to get  really badly out  of  line,  and  for  this 
reason,  they  have  usually been  quite small  (although,  for 
certain currencies,  the cumulative  changes  over  the  whole 
five  year  period  have  been  considerable  in  nominal  terms). 
These  factors  may  help  to explain  why,  with  one  or  two 
exceptions,  realignment  operations  have  not  been  preceded  by 
speculation  on  a  truly disruptive scale.  Moreover,  the 
adjustments have,  in  all  cases,  been  in  the direction 
i~~i~ated by  fundamental  ·economic factors- i.e.  by  relative 
trends  in  costs  and  prices and/or  the behaviour  of  current 
balances.  In  most  cases  they  have,  cumulatively,  produced  a 
discernible shift  of  the real  exchange  rate  in  the 
appropriate direction,  and  in  most  cases  these real  exchange 
rate  changes  have  been  followed  by  changes  in  current  account 
performance,  relatively to the other  coutries  in  the  group, 
in  the direction  that  was  intended. 
Thus  I  think  it.  is fair  to  claim that,  as  an  instrument 
for  managing  the  exchange  rates of  a  groupn  of  countries 
whose  economies  are closely  integrated,  but  whose  economic 
performance  is still divergent  in  important  respects,  the  EMS 
has  proved  rather successful.  Exchange rate changes  have 
been  carried  out  smoothly  and  early  enough  to ensure  that 
10 st:!r·iotts  misalignement:s  between  participant currencies· d-i·d-·-Fto·t 
occur.  At  the  same  time  overshooting  has  been  avoided  and  so 
far·  there has  been  no  case of  a·  meifiEe'F;--state-acUustfng  its 
exchange rate in  one  direction  and  subsequently having  to 
propose  a  corrective adjustment  in  the  opposite  dire~tion. 
The  avoidance  of  serious  misalignments  is probably  one  of  the 
main  reasons  why  commercial  frictions  and  protectionist 
pr·s··o:;sui·-e:-s  have  been  1 ess  in  ~vidence in the EMB--cottntril'E"sr 
than  in  certain other  major  industrial  economies. 
Expectations about  exchange  rate changes  dominate 
capital  flows  prior  to realignments,  while  nominal  interest 
rate differentials  become  predcminent  after the  realignment 
has  been  decided.  This  has  caused  some  departure of  monetary 
.:.;g..;:!···•2t;J<::tt.o::!s  and /or  i ntet-est  rates  ·fr-om  th(:  desi r..ed  path  or-
level,  but  it is the  cost  of  avoiding  overshooting  of  the 
exchange  rate.  This  cost  will  be  minimized  when  the size of 
realignments  can  be  contained  to an  amount  not  much  larger 
than  the  allowed  margin. 
In  summary  therefore considerable  progress  has  been  made 
in  <CKhiE_t'j.ng  e}:chc'ln.';;:Je  t-ab?  stability.,  but  the  e:-:pet-ience  !'-Jith 
the  underlying  goal  of  monetary  and  price stability is so far 
less encouraging,  although  there has  been  some  progress. 
Previoui experience  has  shown  that  monetary stability will  , 
not  be  achieved  through  the  use  of  one  instrument  alone.  Of 
greater  importance to the  longer  term  development  Qf  the 
system  is how  the exchange  rate constraint  is being  used  in 
conjunction  with  other  policy  instruments to develop 
increased  policy coordination. 
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l  ... 4.  Monetary  Coordination 
The  process  of  monetary  coordination  has  been  developed 
further  in  the  Community  than  in  other  international. 
organizations.  This  is partly because  of  the close political 
ties and  the  limited  regional  nature of  the  group,  but  it is 
<'ill £:o  b-E:c.:rtLtse  of  C:t.  c:IE!\tel oping .,.i nsti tuti  onal  i n+rastrLtcture-and 
because  the  exchange  rate commitments  of  the  EMS  tend  to  make 
the  Community's  surveillance process  more  concrete.  In 
contrast  to  procedures  elsewhere,  coordination  through 
conditional  credit  has  not  developed  as  much  in  the 
Commt.tn it·/  .. 
I!J.t:  hQ\dO.£.Ll 
Economic  decision  making  within  the  Community  is 
coordinated  through  the  Council  of  Ministers  in  which  the 
finance  ministers  meet  approximately every  month,  and  through 
thF  swnrry t  mef.:"!ti ngs  o·f  Heads  of  State  which  are  held  three 
times  a  year.  Also  the Commission  presents  an  annual 
o:1ssessment  on  the basis of  ~-Jhi ch  the  finance  ministers are 
required to adopt  an  annual  report  on  the economic  situatio~ 
in  the  Community  and  to set  economic  policy guidelines  to  be 
followed  by  each  Member  State. 
!b§  H9DQt~c~ Ggmmitt§§  §D~ tbg  ~gmmit!§§ gf  §QY§CDQC§ 
The  Monetary  Committee,  composed  of  high  level  officials 
from  the national  treasuries  and  central  banks  as  well  as  a 
representative  from  the  Commission,  has  an  important  role. 
The  Committee  meets  regularly to discusss  a  wide  variety of 
issues.  Every  year  there  is  a  detailed  discussion  of  the 
appropriate targets for  monetary  aggregates  in  each  of  the 
rm~mb§'r'.  ~;t,'::"ttes,  tlie  iinpl i cati  ens  which  a  given  rate of 
monetary  growth  may  have  for  interest rates,  inflation,  real 
growth  and  the  balance  of  payments  and,  of  course,  exchange 
rate relationships  between  the  member  countries.  We  try to 
arrive at  some  sort  of  consensus  on  what  kind  of  monetary 
policy is approprite for  each  country  and  this is expressed, 
to  the extent  possible,  but  in  quantitative terms.  Naturally 
there is no  absolutely  binding  commitment  by  member  states to 
adhere  to  the  monetary  guidelines  which  are  suggested  in  the 
policy papers  prepared  for  these discussions  by  the 
Commission  staff.  But  these discussions  do  force  members  to 
face  up  to the probable  external  consequences  of  their 
domestic  policies  and  they  have  proved  to  be  an  effective 
means  of  exerting  pressure  on  countries to  modify  internal 
policies  when  this appears  to  be  necessary to  avoid  serious 
strains  on  their  exchange  rates. 
; Of  coun:;·e,  for·  those countries  which  target· -on--the~rrron-e-y-­
supply  (in  one  form  or  other)  as distinct  from  domestic 
cn=!dit  or  the  e:-:ch<mge  rate,  the  rieed  ___ fomainf~;iri--the  · 
exchange rate within  predetermined  limits can  pose  problems 
if  the central  bank  is forced  to  intervene  on  a  large scale 
in  the  foreign  e:-:change  mar-kets.  In  fact  the only  EMS 
country for  which  money  supply  (in this case central  bank 
money).·i~.;  t!-,t-:1  main  tc:~rget  vat-:,iable  is  GeFmany~~-Generally 
speaking  I  think  it is fair  to say that  the  need  to  intervene 
has  net  seriously  impeded  the  Bundesbank  in  the pursuit  of 
its monetary  target.  The  growth  of  central  bank  money  has 
been  successfully  kept  within  the target  range  in  each  of  the 
five  years  since the  EMS·  was  established.  What  has  happened 
in  practice is the realignements  have  usually  been  carried 
out.  befcw-e  s:.pec:ulative  capital  movE~ments have  ft..ad  time  to 
build  up  to  a  level  at  which  intervention  would  have  caused 
the  Bundesbnk's  money  stock  target  to overshoot  too 
The  Committee  of  Governors  meets  monthly  in  Basel  and 
its discussions are  focussed  on  exchange rate and  monetary 
policy  i~sues,  with the  Commission  playing  a  lesser  role  than 
in  the  Monetary  Committee  • 
. 
Ih§  GRmmt~~iRQ  ' 
The  Commission  has the right  to address  Recommendations 
to  member  countries  whose  policies appear  to  be  inconsistent 
with  the goals  of  the Community.  The  Commission  has  used 
this right  on  a  selected number  of  occasions,  the  most  recent 
on02  bE>j_ng  during  the  summer  of  1981.  In  the course  o{  1981 
it became  clear that  there  were  serious disequilibria  in  some 
EMS  member  states and  that  the  goal  of  convergence  on  a  low 
rate  of  inflation  was  threatened.  The  Commission  reacted  by 
addressing  Recommendtions  to the governments  of  Belgium  and 
Italy.  These  Recommendations  called  for  certain  budgetary 
_r~stri  cti:ons  and  emphasized  the need  to  reduce  wage  and 
salary  indexation. 
Ll  ·-:· 
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ThE  interaction  between  the  exchange rate mechanism 
CERM>  and  the  overall  process  of  monetary  cooperation  in  the 
Community  is a  complex  process.  The  experience so  far  has 
shown  that  having  a  rule has  given  focus  to the process  of 
cooperation  and  has  reduced  the  tendency  for  members  of  the 
system  to delay  or  fudge  decisions.  From  time to time 
concrete decisions  have  to  be  made  not  only  about  exchange 
rates but  also about  all  the policy variables which  enter 
into their  determination.  Of  course there are costs.  Our 
theoretic understanding  of  the  world  would  suggest  that  some 
types  of  shock  are better  absorbed  by  allowing  the  exchange t-ate  to float· ,cr-eel}- 1 ,  but  in  the real  vmrld it is not-a-l·wc:I'"  ..  'S--
possible to  switch  costlessly between  policy  instruments 
chosi ng  the  optimum  one  for  each  gT;ien· cfi stl.irbance- wi_t_h-out 
loss of  credibility. 
For-mulating  the rule in  terms  of  exchange  rates can  be 
Justified  on  a  number  of  grounds.  Fir-st,  it is now  well 
<::;ccE:ptt~d  th,:;tt.  e>:change  m;=u-ket,.s  are asset  markets  and  so··· 
exchange rate tend  to behave  like asset  prices.  This  has 
some  awkward  consequences  for  small  open  economies  where  the 
exchange  rate is  a  very  important  variable  in  the  whole  pr-ice 
determination  pr-ocess.  Excessive fluctuations  can  lead  to 
inflationary spirals  and  misallocations  of  r-esources. 
Second,  in  a  wor-ld  of  highly  mobile  capital  the  exchange  r-ate 
is  ver-y  r-esponsive  net  only  to actual  but  also ~o expected 
policy  changes.  Focusing  on  the  exchange  r-ate  can  often, 
therefore,  lead  to  ex-ante policy coordination.  Third,  the 
exchange rate is the  most  obviously  shared  var-iable.  Between 
n  countries there are only  n-1  exchange  rates.  Finally the 
exchange rate poses  no  data collection  or  co~pilation 
problems.  The  information  is immediate  and  continuous 
I 
The  exchange rate constraint  of  the  EMS  is not  intended 
to achieve  the  aims  of  the svstem  by  itself.  Rather  than 
being  a  ~irm rule for  the  co~duct of  policy or  a  part  of  • 
poicy,  it is  a  flexible constraint.  There  ar-e  no  rules about 
th8  frEquency  or  size of  changes  in  central  rates, .apart  from 
the  rule that  these  have  to  be  made  by  common  decision.  It 
is through  realignments that  the vital  inter-action  between 
the  exchange  rate rules  and  discretionary policy coor-dination 
c:an  bF::  sec2r-1. 
Exchange  rate realignments  within  the system  have 
gradually  come  to  pr-ovide  the  most  effective occasions  for-
r··:-:?,;:tppr <:d s.::d  c-u·1d  r·ed i r-ecti on  o·f  nati anal  economic  policies, 
evetl i;:liClt:tgh  this resuli:  der·i ··v'es  mot-e  from  actual  pt-act ice 
-··  t~~-,:m  ~;:I~ om  the  t.e:-: ts;  which  form  the  1 egal  basis  of  the  EhS. 
Essentially what  has  happened  is that the constr-aints  imposed 
by  fixed  exchange  rates have  forced  the  participant  countries 
to  pay  gr-eater  attention  to external  factors  in  framing  their-
policies.  Although  a  fair-ly  elabor-ate  institutional 
machiner-y  for  the  coor-dination  of  economic  policy already 
existed  befor-e  the  EMS  was  established,  it had  not  in 
practice produced  any  noticeable results.  There  were  for-
example  pr-ovisions for  coordinating  budgetary  policy and 
budgetary guidelines  were  fixed  ever-y  year  by  the Council  of 
Ministers.  Guidelines  for  monetary  aggr-egates  were  also  laid 
down  and  there  were  frequent  discussions  of  monetary  and 
exchange  r-ate  policy  within  high  level  committees  such  as  the 
Monetary  Committee  and  the  Committee  of  Central  Bank 
GO\/E-~rnot-s:.  The  fc-tc:t  :is,  hot.->Jever,  that  neither·  "guidelines" 
14 nor  an  obligation  to consult  an: t-eally ef·fective as 
constraints  on  policy  makers.  If  a  budgetary  or  monetary 
tc:u  .. ·get  is e:-: ceeded,  the authori.ti es ·ar the  C:~o"LinEry  concerned 
may  or  may  not  do  something  about  it and  if  they  do  decide  to 
do  something  about  it they  may  proceed  with  a  greater  or 
lesser  sense  of  urgency,  depending  upon  how  seriously 
corrective action  will  interfere with  other objectives where, 
to  put~it crudely,  the  retur~ in  terms  of  polttical 
popularity  may  seem  to be  greatsr. 
An  exchange  rate constraint,  by  contrast  forces  the 
authorities to take  a  decision.  A deficit  country  whose 
currency falls to its lower  intervention  limit  in  the  EMS 
band  cannot  finance official  intervention  indefinitely.  It 
co-:HH"iOt  even  bon··o~  ..  ~  indefinitely - c:llthough  it  i-6  ceJ-tainly 
true that  some  deficit countries  have  managed  to spin  out  the 
borrowing  process for  long  time,  thereby storing  up  problems 
for  themselves  at  a  later date.  The  need  to defend  a 
particular  exchange rate forces  a  deficit country to  face 
to the  inevitable necessity of  external  adjustment  and  to 
make  a  conscious decision,shared  with  the other  Member 
States, ~s to  how  that  adjustment  will  be carried  out:  by 
acting  on  the  level  of  incomes  (deflation  of  internal 
demand)~ or  by  acting  on  the relative  level  of  prices 
(devluation),  or  by  some  combination  of  the  two. 
up 
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The  early realignments  were  not  accompanied  by  any  real 
discussion  of  the  economic  policies being  pursu~d,  although 
in  some  cases  member  states took  note  of  the  intention  of  the 
governments  of  those states whose  currencies  were  being 
devalued  to  take certain  measures.  The  devaluation  of  the 
Belgian  franc  on  22  February  1982  represented  a  turning  point 
in  the  appreciation  of  the  implications  of  the  EMS  for 
economic  policy~  in  tht general  agreement  to the  adjustment 
was  made  on  the basis of  governmental  declarations  of  major 
~RQ~ icy  changes.  Fol I awing  the  devc:tl. uat ion,  the  l1onetc:lt-·:/ 
Committee  decided  that it would  conduct  special  examinations 
of  the  economic  and  monetary  situation  in  Belgium,  the first 
of  which  took  place  in  October  1982. 
Subsequent  realignments  were  associated  with  an  equally 
fundamental  reorientation  of  French  economic  policy,  aimed  at 
reducing  the rate of  inflation  and  eliminating  the  external 
tr·adi2  deficit  .. 
The  ease  with  which  it has  been  possible for  deficit 
countries to  borrow  on  international  capital  markets  since 
the  mid-seventies  has  to  a  large extent  freed  them  from  the 
need  to use  the  Community's  official  conditional  credit 
15 fc:icilities  and  has  thus  enabled  them  to  escap_e.t-he-------------------
constraints  upon  their  economic  policies  which  these entail. 
This  state of  affairs has  somewh·,;rt ·on:.1nt-eafFe efTectfveness 
of  the  Community's  credit facilities as  instruments  of 
economic  policy coordina-tion.· 
The  first  Community  loans  to  which  economic  policy 
cor··,d i ti  ons  ~J€-::'n?  fell~ mall y  at  t~ched  ~'<!ere  those -(JJ-Fant:ed  to Italy 
and  Ireland  in  1976.  In  the case of  Italy,  the  economic 
policy conditions,  which  were  reviewed  periodically, 
c:c:insi stt:!d  of  t~JO 
11 f i no:tl
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targets relating to the  growth  of  public  expenditure,  to the 
size of  the  budget  deficit,  to its monetary  financing  and  to 
the  expansion  of  domestic  credit.  In  the case ~f  Ireland, 
the  economic  policy conditions,  which  were  subject  to similar 
periodic  review,  dealt  with  the central  government  borrowing 
requirement,  the share to  be  financed  by  non-monetary  means 
and  the  need  to avoid  any  relaxation  of  monetary  policy. 
In  thf?.  case of  t,he  Community  loan  e:-:tended  to France  in 
the  SurruT)f-t- of  1983,, a  pac kctge  of  restrict  i \/e  measw-es  had 
already  been  introduced  by  the  French  government  a  few  weeks 
ec:d·-·lier·,  i~ollo~\ling  the e;.:change  rate realignment  in  March  of 
that  ye;r.  It  was  considered  that  these  m~asures offered  , 
sufficient  assurance that  the necessary  internal  and  external 
adjustment  would  be  achieved  and  the decision  of  t~e Council 
which  approved  the  loan  referred  specifically to  them. 
5.  The  EMS  and  the  International  Monetary  System 
In  some  respects the existing set  of  arrangements  in  the 
international  monetary  system  has  performed  well  over 
the  period  since the  breakdown  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system, 
and  it seems  certain that  the  previous  arrangements  would 
hav~:beerr tao rigid  to cope  with  the  events  that  were  seen 
during  the  1970's.  That.of  course  leaves open  the question 
of  whether  the  same  events  would  in  fact  have  occurred if  a 
different  and  less flexible  system  had  remained  in  place. 
Although  opinions differ  widely  on  these questions,  it is 
generally  agreed  that at  least  some  modifications to our 
current  set  of  arrangements are desireable.  The  Versailles 
summit  set  up  the  intervention  study  group  and  the 
t'Jillio:1rnsbLwg  s.;ummit  "in\·'j.tecf  the  Ministers  of  Finance·,  in 
consultation  with  the  IMF,  to define  the  conditions  for 
:L  rnpt-ovi ng  thE~  international  monetary  system. 
11 
The  EMS  must  coexist  with  the  international  monetary 
arrangements.  It cannot  and  does  not  seek  to  isolate itself 
from  the rest  of  the  world.  While  the  international  system 
is in  a  rather fluid  and  evolving  state,  two  questions  need 
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•-to  be  ans~·'JETed.  f·7 i r-st,  does  the  Ef"IS  make  1 i fe  easi.e~=-OF· -fftaFe-
difficult  for- its members  under- the  prevailing circumstances? 
Second,  is the  e;.; i stance of  the  EMS  . rn:::eTy-·toassj:-st  the 
development  of  a  more  cohesive  inter-national  system? 
.·  .... 
r  The  most  outstanding  featur-e  of  the  inter-national 
mor(etary  sy~::;tem  ove1·  ..  thF2  1970's  has  been  the  shor-t  and  1 c:mg 
t.E•r· m'  \IO::tr·· i  c(b i lit'/ of  e:-:ch,:mge  r-ates,  2.nd  the  ach  j. evemt',;nts  o·f 
the  EMS  in  r-elation  to this topic  has  been  discussed  above. 
It  might  however- be  ar-gued  that  the  attempt  to  for-m  a  zone  of 
greater  monetar-y  stability with  an  exchange  r-ate  r-ule  as  one 
cf  it.  s  pr- i mat-·'>'..- i nst.r-ument.s  t-·,as  madt-:  Eur-ope  e:.: ce.ssi vel y 
i::r.::;nce~-ned  <.;rJout.  e;.;r.:hange  r-ate  changes. 
Europeans  fr-equently  complain  about  the  problems  which  a 
volatile dollar  has  caused  for- the  EMS  as  a  whole  and  for  its 
constituent  members.  Some  of  these  complaints are 
disingenuous  and  exaggerated.  But  an  unstable dollar  can 
complic~;re Communit'l  economic  mianagement.  In  the ftt·st  ple.ct::· 
when  funds  move  out  of  dollar-s  the  flows  are not  distr-ibuted 
evenly  among  EMS  curr-enctes,  but  go  pr-edominantly,  in  the 
first  i~stanc:e,  into  the  deutschmark.  This  can  uncover  , 
1 ;;:d.:ent  b:~nsi ens within  the  S)lStE•m,  but  it ho:1s  at  t'i ii'IE'!S  <ill so 
pr0duced  tensions  even  when  the  competitive positiQn  of  the 
other  countries vis-a-vis  Ger-many  appears  to  b~ healthy  and 
t!·;ei 1···  balance  o·F  payments  in  good  shape,  because  the 
deutschmark  is the only  EMS  currency  which  is widely  used 
internationally.  In  these  cases  EMS  currencies other  than 
Germany  may  find  themselves  forced  to  devalue  or  to deflate 
or  to  run  down  thetr  r-eserves  simply  because  of  what  is 
happening  to the dollar.  Secondly,  large changes  in  the  real 
exchange  rates  of  major  thir-d  currencies such  as the dollar 
.:md  the  yen  can  haver far--reaching  effects on  resour-ce• 
~Tl~~~Ficn in  the  Community,  whose  economy  is relatively open 
and  whose  producer-s  tend  to be  mor-e  strongly  influenced  by 
external  developments  than  is perhaps  the  case  in  the  United 
States.  As  discussed  above,  the  EMS  has  attenuated  these 
effects.  It also provides its members  with  extr-a  r-esources 
to  ride out  temporary  fluctuations  in  exchange  rates.  The 
very  shor-t-term financial  mechanism,  which  has  been 
extensively  used,  is  a  form  of  reserve pooling. 
When  it was  set  up  a  number- of  fear-s  were  expr-essed  that 
the  EMS  was  swimming  against  the tide of  the  inter-national 
monetary  eystem,  that  it could  undermine  the  IMF  and  that  the 
ECU  could  compete  with  the  SDR.  The  recor-d  shows  that  the 
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l!' El"IS  is  i nnocer1t  on  each  of  these counts  and  that  furt-h-ert'IIDf"e  -
it has  given  some  useful  cohesion  which  has  allowed  Europe  to 
be  men~ constructive in  the  on-·gofrig  aeSafe-~abol:it the 
international  system. 
Since it was  set  up  there has  been  a  decrease  in  the 
polarisation  of  the  fixed  versus floating  exchange  rate 
deb.::;te-·..  The  EMS  trJc\S  initial},.y characterisecl ~b-y-some  <:is  21  · 
naive  attempt  to re-establish  a  fixed  rate system  in  the 
middle  of  a  world  which  was  moving  steadily towards  floating 
rates.  The  five  subsequent  years  have  shown  this view  to  be 
false.  First,  as  discussed  above  the  system  does  have  an 
exchange  rate constraint  but  a  very  different  one  from  that 
of  the Bretton  Woods  system.  Second  there has  been  a  general 
rnC,\iE?mE:nt  ·l.::otrJ<::·u-ds  questioning  the  benE?f its of  Ltr...constrai ned 
floating.  The  IMF's  table of  exchange  rate arrangements 
shows  that  only eight  currencies are classified as  floating 
independently.  It is now  recognised  that different 
arrangements  may  be  more  suitable for  different countries  or 
groups  of  countries.  Also  there  have  been  an  increasing 
number  of  suggestions,  including  those  of  Paul  Armington  and 
of  John~illiamson, for  schemes  which  would  allow  greater 
management  of  all  the  important  exchange rates.  It  seems 
increasingly clear that  the world  can  live with  groups  of 
ccuntri~s chasing  the final  details of  the particular  • 
arrangements  which  suit  them  according  to criteria like their 
openness  and  hence  the  magnitude  of  the  impact  of  the 
exchange  rate on  their  domestic  price structure.  A  greater 
organisation  will  not  necessarily  come  from  all  applying 
exactly the  same  rules;  it will  come  from  increased 
discretionary policy coordination. 
The  Community  countries  have  been  highly supportive of 
the  IMF,  and  the  EMS  arrangements  do  not  create any  conflict. 
The  Exchange  rate arrangement  is compatiable  with  Artice  IV 
which  E~;::press-1 y  rec:ogni ses the  pos·:::.i bi 1 it  y  that  the 
-;:nelntH·2t- countries of  the  II'1F  may  adtjpt  "co-operative 
arrangements  by  which  members  maintain  the value  of  their 
currencies  in  relation to the value  of  the currency  or 
cun··enci  E.'S.  of  othf?r- members."  The  EI1S  countries  in 
accordance  with  the  procedures  of  Article  IV  of  course 
informed  the  IMF  when  the  system  was  e~tablished and  keep  the 
Fund  fully  informed  when  there are exchange rate 
r··ealignments. 
The  EMS  does  not  create extra difficulties for  the 
Fund's surveillance procedures.  Each  Community  country  is 
subject to  an  annual  consultation  in  exactly the  same  way  as 
any  other  member.  The  Fund  now  intends  to put  more  weight  on 
exchange  rate developments  in  these consultations  and  in  its 
discussions  on  the  world  economic  outlook.  There  may  be 
18 
l 
l  .. oc:cassi  on;.:;  in  thL~  ·f utLtre  ~·Jhen  the  Fund  consi  der""-s  that- sofll1?--
country participating  in  the  EMS  should  change  it~  exc~ange 
r·.:,\te.  The  country·  concerned  C:oC!Id·-n·af-i mpieme.nt -this advice 
without  triggering  a  general  realignment  within  the  EMS,  or 
without  the  common  agreement  of  the other  EMS  countries.  As 
well  as  the obligation  to consult  with  the others laid  down 
in  the rules,  the  mechanics  of  the  system  are such  that  one 
cs·ntr.::\l  t-ate  cannot  changf.·?  ~o>Ji.,thout  all  the  o-thers  changt-r1g. 
This  is because  the  central  rates are expressed  in  terms  of 
the  ECU,  which  is a  basket  of  all  the currencies.  There  is 
however  no  necessary  conflict.  The  object  of  the  system  is 
not  to maintain  a  given  set  of  exchange relationships for 
e'-/f::.•t""" 
rhe  EMS  does offer its members  the  possibi~ity of 
extensive credit facilities,  which  could  entail  the  danger 
that it would  undermine  IMF  conditionality.  Two  points 
should  however  be  kept  in  mind.  First,  as  has  been  discussed 
above  the  EMS  exercises  a  broader  and  earlier form  of 
conditionality on  its members  through  the exchange rate 
arrangements  and  especially through  the  realignment  process. 
Second, fhere  is no  reason  to  assume  that the conditionality 
attached  to  Community  credit  need  be  any  weaker  than  that 
at:to:-iched.  to  H'IF  credit.  It therefore seems  tl1at  any  cla·;:;h 
between  the  two  i.s  likely to ba more  apparent  than  real.  • 
6.  Monetary  Identity  and  the  ECU 
The  development  of  the  ECU  has  fallen  short  of  the 
aspirations that  were  voiced  in  the  Brussels  Resolution  -at 
least  so  far  as official  use  of  the  ECU  is concerned.  ECU 
ar~_!1_Dt  e:·:tE?nsi \lel y  used by central  banks  for·  settlement 
purposes.  As  an  asset,  they  are precarious,  on  the  one  hand, 
because  they  are  created  by  means  of  a  temporary  swap  system 
with  no  indication  as  to what  may  happen  after the 
transitional  stage,  and,  en  the other,  because the  volume  in 
existence is unstable,  given  that it depends  on  variables 
which  are  themselves  extremely  volatile  - the price of  gold 
and  the  exchange-rate  of  the dollar.  Their  attrctiveness as 
an  asset  is further  circumscribed  by  their  limited 
acceptability  (creditors are  under  no  obligation  to accept 
ECU  except  in  settlement  of  a  claim  maturing  under  the  very 
short-term financing  factility and  only  up  to  50%  of  that 
claim).  Accumulated  creditor positions  in  ECU  are  not 
convertible,  and  the yield  is  low  (being  an  average  of 
official  discount  rates).  For  all  these  reasons,  ECU  are 
only  used  on  a  small  scale even  in  cases  where  debtors  are 
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e:<plicity entitled to  use  them.  A  new  type  of-oper-.ationhas, 
never-theless,  been  intr-oduced,  with  swaps  between  ECU  and 
n,;:d:·.ional  cur-r-encies  being  uti lisecr-rn·-araer:--;fo_m_66il ise 
available  ECU.  As  things  stand  at  present,  the  ECU  is 
consider-ed  not  so  much  a  r-eser-ve  asset  as  a  means  of. cr-edit 
that  will  eventually have  to  be  settled using  other- assets. 
F·r·-om  l c/7'7'  to  1983,  about  so;~  of  vet-y  shor-t-·tet-m  ... 
t1nancing  operations  wer-e  unwound  without  r-ecour-se  to the  ECU 
thr-ough  offsetting  or- advance  r-epayments  with  cr-editor 
currencies.  The  cumulative  amount  of  settlements  in  ECU  is 
of  the  or-der- of  2.000  million  ECU  over- the  whole  per-iod.  This 
figure  compar-es  with  a  total  ECU  stock  of  53.000  milion  at 
end-1983.  Voluntary  transctions  have  resulted  in  net 
repurchases  of  ECU,  which  is also  indicative  o~ central 
banks'  efforts to hold  down  the  level  of  net  ECU  balances. 
In  sharp  contr-ast  with  the  mar-ked  lack  of  enthusiasm for 
the  ECU  in  official  cir-cles?  use  of  the  ECU  in  the private 
SE!Ctcr  ry;,:..s  been  highly  E•ncour-agi ng.  The  shcwt-ter-m  ECU 
market  .interbank  market  and  shor-t-ter-m  transactions)  is at 
present  estimated at  10.000 million  ECU;  the  volume  of  long-
term  is~ues totals 3.300 million  ECU  - making  the  ECU  the  , 
currency  unit  with  the third  largest  shar-e  in  euro-market 
bon··c:;v;j_ rH.J  in  1983;  outstanding  med i um-·t.enn  synd  i ca!-ed  bank 
credits amount  to about  2.000  million  ECU. 
This  may  be  a  promising  development  both  for  Eur-opean 
monetary  cohesion  and  for  the resistance of  the  EMS  to 
external  shocks.  Freer  use  of  the  ECU  in  commercial  and 
financial  operations  in  Europe  would  require  incr-eased 
coordination  of  policies and  thus contribute to convergence. 
More  extensive  international  use  of  the  ECU  for  invoicing, 
settlement,  bor-rowing  and  investment  would  also help  to 
,~t?i::JuC:e  the  i mpe:-1ct  rjf  e:-:ternal  shocks,  and  spr-ead  it  ove1·- tt-,e 
entire set  of  Community  curr-encies. 
So  far  the  role  of  the  ECU  in  private credit  markets  has 
developed  mere  or- less spontaneously,  with  varying  degrees  of 
approval  on  the  part  of  individual  member  states.  But  the  ECU 
market  is  now  so  large that  a  more  unifor-m  r-esponse  to  market 
needs is r-equired  from  the  national  authorities of  Community 
cc:-;Ltn tt-i es  . 
2() 
l  ... 7.  Strengthening  the  EMS 
So  where  do  we  go  from  here?  It  is fairly clear  that 
governments?  inside the  Community  as  indeed  outside lt too, 
are disinclined  at  the  present  time  to  take  any  very  bold  or 
far  reaching  initiatives in  this field.  In  particular 
n;;:(t. i r.:m't:l.l  go\'et-nroe·nt s  are  most.,..  rel Ltctant  to take ~any  ste~-­
which  involve  an  obvious  abandonment  of  formal  autonomy  in 
matters  of  economic  policy  making  -however  illusory the 
autonomy  of  small  or  medium  sized  economies  in  today's 
interdepedent  world  may  be  - to  some  supranational  or 
collective institution.  Therefore,  if  we  are  to  make  progress 
it is  I j, keJ. '/  to take  the form  of  small  and  no.t  unduly 
ambit  i (JUS  i mpr·ovement s  to the  preserTt  .:..rrangemants  rather· 
than  of  grand  designs  for  sweeping  reforms. 
What  improvements  can  realistically be  envisaged? 
So  far  as  the  exchange  rate arrangements  are  concerned, 
the  improvement  which  the  Commission  would  most  like to see 
is the  f)'·ll  part  i ci pat ion  o-f  sterling.  The  arguments  against 
this,  based  on  the  incompatibility of  a  fixed  exchange  rate 
with  the pursuit  of  an  internal  money  supply target  no  longer 
sounc:!  c.on-....·inc:ing.  If  Ger··many  can  reconcile the pursuits of, 
both  objectives,  then  the  UK  shouJ.d  be  able to do  so  as  well, 
although  I  do  think  it would  be  prudent  to  recogni~e that 
this particular  balancing  act  may  sometimes  prove difficult 
if  we  have  two  large countries  in  the  system  trying  to 
perform it,  instead  of  just  one  as  at  present,  especially 
when  both  the  currencies  concerned  are  widely  used 
internationally.  Nor  do  I  believe that  the  fact  that  sterling 
is  i:<.  "pet.r  .. ·ocu.;-n2ncy"  any  1 r.:mger  constitutes  an  i nst.a··mr.Junto."lb J.  e 
obstacle.  No  doubt  demand  for  sterling will  continue to  be 
influenced  by  fluctuations  in  the price  of  crude oil,  but 
tl  ..  ~t::r~:e  is  ~1CJ  recrson  I'Jhy  •-tp~·J<:1rd  CJI~  downwaJ~d  pr·essLwe  on  ttH? 
exchange  rate thus  induc~d should  not  be dealt  with  by  use  of 
the reserves,  Community  credit  mechanisms,  the  exchange  rate, 
or  some  combination  of  these. 
Another  possibility is that the +/- 6%  margins  which 
Italy has  operated  since the  system  was  launched  might  be 
narrowed,  all  or  part  of  the  way  towrds  the +/- 2.25%  appJ.ied 
by  the  other  countries.  I  think  it is only  fair  to say that 
wider  margins  were  a  necessary  condition  for  Italy's 
participation  in  the  EMS  exchange  rate  arrangements  and  they 
have  enabled  the  Italian authorities to manage  their  exchange 
rate  smoothly~  without  crises and  trauma.  On  the other  hand 
margins  as  wide  as  this do  weaken  the constraint  which  the 
exchange  rate exerts  on  policy  makers.  Even  in  the  turbulent 
period  of  the  last  5  years  the  Italian authorities have  not 
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o·ften. had  to  make  fu.l  use  of  their- ~.<Ji der- marg..i ns  and ... 
I  bel1eve  that  in  the  more  stable environment  which  may 
r~asonabl  y  be  foresc:en  for  the  rn?;;:--c-Fe~J--years-f]1e-y ·caul d  1 i ve 
w1th  narrower  margins. 
It  has  sometimes  been  suggested  that  exchange  rate 
realignments  within  the  system  should  be  timed  in  such  a  way 
;:,s;  to ·£tnt i c j_  p;::\te  e;.; ch.:mge· n·,ar:)-::et  pi~essLtre,  aR-E!- tht:ts  avord··· 
speculation.  At  first  sight  this seems eminently desireable 
- to  the extent  that  it is possible.  But  in fact,  if  the 
need  far  exchange rate adjustment  is not  obvious  to 
the  markets,  then  it  may  not  be  obvious  to  the authorities 
either.  This  in  turn  means  that  such  realignments if they 
can  be  agreed  upon  at  all,  will  tend  to be  small  and  if 
r(;~;::J. i gniTH:O?nts  b~:come  sm.-all et- then,  unless  i nf  1 aU  on 
differentials  become  smaller  too,  the  need  for  realignments 
will  arise more  frequently.  So  there is  a  danger  that this 
approach  might  transform  the  EMS  into something  very  close  to 
<=•.  "c!·-awlint_::j  peq"  r-egime.  Mall""y'  people,  I  kno~..,,  ~o.~ottld  see  no 
harm  in  that.  Our  own  feeling  however  is that  if the  process 
of  exchange rate adjustment  was  dedramatized  too  much,  then 
the  e;.;ct-i'nge  ,~ate  trJ_oul d  cease  to  oper.::tte  as  a  constraint  on 
economic  policy  and  its effectiveness as  a  stabilizing 
influence,  which  is one  of  the  most  positive features  of  EMS 
e;;pt.'?r·-ier-:ci:?,  t'·JOu.ld  be  greatly·  weakened.  At  a  time  when 
inflationary forces  remains  strong  this  would  be  most 
t 
Obviously,  greater  convergence  of  economic  performance 
will  do  more  than  anything  to help  the  exchange rate 
arrangements  to  work  smoothly.  In  these  conditions  exchange 
rate changes  could  be  both  small  and  infrequent.  What  can  we 
do  to further  the  development  of  such  conditions? 
One  line of  action  which  I  should  like to  see  followed 
~'JouJ.d  bii~  for- .::"tll  our  member  states to declare formally  thc:tt 
t~~y-~i{f in  future  abst~in from  unilateral  recourse to 
restrictions  on  current  payments  (e.g.  limits  on  tourist 
expenditure,  import  deposit  schemes).  Such  measures  have  been 
imposed  temporarily  by  certain  members  from  time  to  time.  In 
my  view  they  are  inadequate  as  a  substitute for  more 
fundamental  measures  and  unnecessary  as  a  complement  to  them. 
At  the  very  least  their  use  should  be  conditional  upon  the 
prior  agreement  of  the rest  of  the  Community. 
But  the  most  important  requirement  is that  we  should 
improve  surveillance and  coordination  of  our  members  economic 
policies.  In  particular  I  believe that  we  should  pay  more 
attention  to coordination  of  budgetary  policy  and  to ensuring 
that  the  mix  between  monetary  and  budgetary  policies 
contributes to exchange  rate stability.  Up  till  now  there 
... ., ... i  ..  :.: ...  ::. .. 
has  been  a  tendency  for  too  much  of  the burden  of  ~mainta.i-nir·,g 
exchange  rate stability to fall  on  the shoulders  of  the 
monetar·y  authorities.  Budgetary--poh-cy  has  ai r-'foo  often 
been  framed  without  due  ~egard to the  consequences for  the 
balance  of  payments  and  the  exchange  rate.  Belgium,  Italy~ 
Denmark  and  Ireland  are all  examples  of  EMS  countries  where 
budgetary  policy has seriously weakened  the  external 
pc;s it  i  .. on  ..  ... 
I  believe that  we  should  also  make  more  strenuous 
efforts to ensure effective surveillance of  member  countries· 
external  borrowing.  As  I  mentioned  earlier,  the  ease  with 
which  countries have  been  able to  borrow  on  the  international 
capital  markets  has  encouraged  some  of  them  to  borrow  in 
circumstances  where  there should  have  been  mor~ emphasis  on 
adjustment.  The  Community  has  a  number  of  official  and 
conditional  credit facilities available.  If  these  had  been 
used  and  apropriate conditions  had  been  imposed  and  observed, 
I  think  the external  position  of  some  of  our  member  countries 
today  might  be considerably healthier  than  it is.  It is 
important  that  we  should  make  more  active use  of  these 
conclitiop·=l.l  -facilitie:·s  in  futur-e. 
As  regards strengthening  the official  and private role 
the  ~CU we  could  envisage: 
t 
ELC§tLL,  an  increase  in  the acceptability of  ~he ECU  as 
a  central  bank  reserve asset  by  abolishing  or  reducing  the 
present  limitations on  its use  and  increasing  the  yield 
c\\icd.lable  on  it; 
§@£QQ~l~,  we  should  seriously consider  allowing  central 
bo,mks  out£;;i de:- the  Community  to hold  ECU  as  reserve assets if 
they  wish  to  do  so.  This  might~  for  example,  be  an  attractive 
proposition  for  countries  which  conduct  a  high  proportion  of 
their totaL foreign  trade with  the  Community  and  which,  under 
-preser,t:  Elrrc:\rHJements,  may  find  that  the  purchasing  powE·r  of 
their reserves,  in  terms  of  the currencies  which  they  need  to 
pay  for  imports,  can  fluctuate  unpredictably  and  alarmingly; 
Ibir~ly,  removal  of  those  legal  restrictions on  the 
private use  of  the  ECU  which  still, regrettably,  survive  in 
certain  member  states  and  which  thus constitute an  obstacle 
to  the further  integration  of  Community  financial  markets. 
If  the  somewhat  antiquated  structure of  Europe's  economy 
today  is to  be  transformed  and  equipped  to meet  the 
challenges  of  the future,  a  massive  increase  in  investment, 
:i.  r-,  net•  .  .:  techno]. ogy  and  ne~··J  i ndustt-i es,  t'lli 11  be  n?qui red.  Much 
of  the  finance  for  such  investment  will  no  doubt  continue  to 
come,  as it has  in  the past,  from  the  reinvested  profits of 
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i ndustJ~y.  But· the role  of  equity  investment  must  n-..':3-t.-~ ----
neglected.  At  present,  equity  investment  plays  a  far  less 
·::;igni·ficant  pat-t  in  the  financing  crf··prtvir'Eef-b"l..tsrn-es·s  in  ·the 
Community  than  is the case  in  the United  States.  To  a  large 
extent this is because  there are still  numerous  obst~cles and 
restrictions,  both  legal  and  administrative,  to the free  flow 
of  capital  and  investment  income  between  member  states.  The 
c:thcd. i t..i on  of  such  n?stt-i ct  ions  and  the  development  of  ·a +ut.-l-y  ... 
integrated  Community  capital  market  is  a  necessary,  although 
of  course  not  a  sufficient,  condition  for  the  increase  in 
productive  investment  than  the modernization  of  our  economies 
n::~qui res. 
If  we  can  achieve significant progress  in  these  areas: 
consolidation  of  the  EMS  exchange  rate arrangements 
improved  economic  policy coordination 
encouraging  the official  and  private use  of  the  ECU 
....  dE!\-'t::l ojment  o-F  an  integrated  Community capital  market 
then  I  believe that  we  shall  have  created  a  financial 
en\li t-onifrent  t!i<::lt  ~Ji 11  be.  mLtch  more  f avoLtr.=tb 1 e  to  non--·· 
j.n·fl.:;ti.c:m.,;.r·y  econrjmic  development  th.an  that  which  e:dsts 
tocL:\:y'.  I  am  afrcdd,  however,  that  the  road  is still  long 
bwnp'y'. 
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